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FAIR MAJORITIES IN PROPORTIONAL VOTING
Frantǐsek Turnovec
In parliaments elected by proportional systems the seats are allocated to the elected political
parties roughly proportionally to the shares of votes for the party lists. Assuming that members
of the parliament representing the same party are voting together, it has sense to require that
distribution of the influence of the parties in parliamentary decision making is proportional to
the distribution of seats. There exist measures (so called voting power indices) reflecting an
ability of each party to influence outcome of voting. Power indices are functions of distribution
of seats and voting quota (where voting quota means a minimal number of votes required to
pass a proposal). By a fair voting rule we call such a quota that leads to proportionality of
relative influence to relative representation. Usually simple majority is not a fair voting rule.
That is the reason why so called qualified or constitutional majority is being used in voting
about important issues requiring higher level of consensus. Qualified majority is usually fixed
(60% or 66.67%) independently on the structure of political representation. In the paper we use
game-theoretical model of voting to find a quota that defines the fair voting rule as a function
of the structure of political representation. Such a quota we call a fair majority. Fair majorities
can differ for different structures of the parliament. Concept of a fair majority is applied on
the Lower House of the Czech Parliament elected in 2010.
Keywords: fair majority, power indices, quota interval of stable power, simple weighted
committee, voting power
Classification: 91A12, 91A40, 05C65
1. FAIRNESS IN VOTING
A qualified majority in committee voting is a requirement for a proposal to gain a spec-
ified level or type of support which exceeds a simple majority (over 50 %). In some
jurisdictions, for example, parliamentary procedure requires that any action that may
alter the rights of the minority has to have a qualified majority support. Particular de-
signs of qualified majority (such as 60 % or two-thirds majority) are selected “ad hoc”,
without quantitative justification. In this paper we try to provide such a justification,
defining qualified majority by a “fair quota”, providing each legislator with (approxi-
mately) the same influence, measured as an a priori voting power.
Let us consider a committee with n members. Each member has some voting weight
(number of votes, shares etc.) and a voting rule is defined by a minimal sum of weights
required for passing a proposal (model of such a committee is called a weighted voting
committee). Given a voting rule, voting weights provide committee members with voting
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power. Voting power means an ability to influence the outcome of voting. Voting power
indices are used to quantify the voting power.
Voting power is not directly observable: as a proxy for it voting weights are used.
Therefore, fairness is usually defined in terms of voting weights (e. g. voting weights
are proportional to the results of an election or to the shares in a share-holding com-
pany). Assuming that a principle of fair distribution of voting weights is selected, we
are addressing the question of how to achieve equality of relative voting power (at least
approximately) to relative voting weights. For evaluation of voting power we are using
concepts of a priori power indices (a comprehensive survey of power indices theory see in
Felsenthal and Machover [2]). The concepts of optimal quota, introduced by S lomczyński
and Życzkowski [9, 10] for the EU Council of Ministers distribution of national voting
weights (weights equal to square roots of population and quota that provides each citi-
zen of the EU with the same indirect voting power measured by Penrose–Banzhaf index
independently on her national affiliation), and of intervals of stable power (Turnovec
[11]) are used to find, given voting weights, a fair voting rule minimizing the distance
between actors’ relative voting weights and their relative voting power.
In the second section we provide definitions, the third section presents a short overview
of the results from Turnovec [11] on concepts of quota intervals of stable power and the
fair quota, and the fourth section applies the concept of the fair quota for the Lower
House of the Czech Parliament elected in 2010.
2. COMMITTEES AND VOTING POWER
A simple weighted committee is a pair [N,w], where N be a finite set of n committee
members i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) be a nonnegative vector of committee
members’ voting weights (e. g. votes or shares). By 2N we denote the power set of N
(set of all subsets of N). By voting coalition we mean an element S ∈ 2N , the subset
of committee members voting uniformly (YES or NO), and w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi denotes
the voting weight of coalition S. The voting rule is usually defined by majority quota
q satisfying w(N)2 < q ≤ w(N), where q represents the minimal total weight necessary
to approve the proposal. Triple [N, q,w] we call a simple quota weighted committee.
The voting coalition S in committee [N, q,w] is called a winning one if w(S) ≥ q and a
losing one in the opposite case. The winning voting coalition S is called critical if for at
least one member k ∈ S it holds w(S \ k) < q (we say that k is critical in S). Critical
winning voting coalition S is called minimal if any of its members is critical in S.
A priori voting power analysis seeks an answer to the following question: Given a
simple quota weighted committee [N, q,w], what is an influence of its members over the
outcome of voting? The absolute voting power of a member is defined as a probability
Πi[N, q,w] that i will be decisive in the sense that such a situation appears in which
she would be able to decide the outcome of voting by her vote (Nurmi [5] and Turnovec




Two basic concepts of decisiveness are used: swing position and pivotal position. The
swing position is an ability of an individual voter to change the outcome of voting by a
unilateral switch from YES to NO (if member j is critical with respect to a coalition S,
we say that he has a swing in S). The pivotal position is such a position of an individual
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voter in a permutation of voters expressing a ranking of attitudes of members to the
voted issue (from the most preferable to the least preferable) and the corresponding
order of forming of the winning coalition, in which her vote YES means a YES outcome
of voting and her vote NO means a NO outcome of voting (we say that j is pivotal in
the permutation considered).
Let us denote by i the member of the simple quota weighted committee [N, q,w],
by W (N, q,w) the set of all winning coalitions and by Wi(N, q,w) the set of all win-
ning coalitions with i, by C(N, q,w) the set of all critical winning coalitions, and by
Ci(N, q,w) the set of all critical winning coalitions i has the swing in, by P (N) the set
of all permutations of N and by Pi(N, q,w) the set of all permutations i is pivotal in.
By card(S) we denote the cardinality of S, card(∅) = 0.
Assuming many voting acts and all coalitions equally likely, it makes sense to evaluate
the a priori voting power of each member of the committee by the probability to have
a swing, measured by the absolute Penrose–Banzhaf (PB) power index (Penrose [7],
Banzhaf [1]) ΠPBi (N, q,w) =
card(Ci)
2n−1 , where card(Ci) is the number of all winning
coalitions the member i has the swing in, 2n−1 is the number of all possible coalitions
with i. To compare the relative power of different committee members, the relative form




While the absolute PB is based on a well-established probability model (see e. g. Owen
[6]), its normalization (relative PB index) destroys this probabilistic interpretation, the
relative PB index simply answers the question of what is the voter i’s share in all possible
swings.
Assuming many voting acts and all possible permutations equally likely, it makes
sense to evaluate an a priori voting power of each committee member by the proba-
bility of being in pivotal situation, measured by the Shapley–Shubik (SS) power index
(Shapley and Shubik [8]): ΠSSi (N, q,w) =
card(Pi)
n! , where card(Pi) is the number of
all permutations in which the committee member i is pivotal, and n! is the number of
all possible permutations of committee members. Since
∑
i∈N card(Pi) = n! it holds
that πSSi (N, q,w) =
card(Pi)P
k∈N card(Pk)
= card(Pi)n! , i. e. the absolute and relative form of the
SS-power index is the same.
It can be easily seen that for any α > 0 and any power index based on swings or
pivots positions it holds that Πi(N,αq, αw) = Πi(N, q,w). Therefore, without the loss
of generality, we shall assume throughout the text that
∑
i∈N wi = 1 and 0.5 < q ≤ 1,
using only relative weights and relative quotas in the analysis.
3. QUOTA INTERVALS OF STABLE POWER AND THE FAIR QUOTA
Let us formally define a few concepts we shall use later in this paper:
Definition 1. Let w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) be a fair distribution of voting weights (with
whatever principle is used to justify it) in a simple weighted committee [N,w], π is a
relative power index, π(N, q,w) is a vector valued function of q, and d is a distance
function, then the voting rule q1 is said to be at least as fair as voting rule q2 with
respect to the selected π and distance d if d(w,π(N, q1,w)) ≤ d(w,π(N, q2,w)).
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Intuitively, given w, the voting rule q1 is preferred to the voting rule q2 if q1 generates
a distribution of power closer to the distribution of weights than the voting rule q2.
Definition 2. The voting rule q∗ minimizing a distance d between π(N, q,w) and w is
called a fair voting rule (fair quota) for the power index π with respect to the distance d.
In Turnovec [11] we provided proofs of the following statements:
Proposition 1. Let [N, q,w] be a simple quota weighted committee and Cis be the
set of critical winning coalitions of the size s in which i has a swing, then card(Pi) =∑
s∈N card(Cis)(s− 1)! (n− s)! is the number of permutations with the pivotal position
of i in [N, q,w].
From Proposition 1 it follows that the number of pivotal positions corresponds to the
number and structure of swings. If in two different committees sets of swing coalitions
are identical, then the sets of pivotal positions are also the same.
Proposition 2. Let [N, q1,w] and [N, q2,w], q1 6= q2, be two simple quota weighted
committees such that W (N, q1,w) = W (N, q2,w), then Ci(N, q1,w) = Ci(N, q2,w) and
Pi(N, q1,w) = Pi(N, q2,w) for all i ∈ N.
From Proposition 2 it follows that in two different committees with the same set
of members, the same weights and the same sets of winning coalitions, the PB-power
indices and SS-power indices are the same in both committees, independently of quotas.
Proposition 3. Let [N, q,w] be a simple quota weighted committee with a quota q,
µ+(q) = minS∈W (N,q,w)(w(S)− q) and µ−(q) = minS∈2N\W (N,q,w)(q − w(S)). Then for
any particular quota q we have W (n, q,w) = W (N, γ,w) for all γ ∈ (q − µ−(q), q +
µ+(q)].
From Propositions 2 and 3 it follows that swing and pivot based power indices are
the same for all quotas γ ∈ (q − µ−(q), q + µ+(q)]. Therefore the interval of quotas
(q − µ−(q), q + µ+(q)] we call an interval of stable power for quota q. Quota γ∗ ∈
(q − µ−(q), q + µ+(q)] is called the marginal quota for q if µ+(γ∗) = 0.
Now let us define a partition of the power set 2N into equal weight classes Ω(0), Ω(1), . . .
. . . , Ω(r) (such that the weight of different coalitions from the same class is the same
and the weights of different coalitions from different classes are different). For the
completeness set w(∅) = 0. Consider the weight-increasing ordering of equal weight
classes Ω(0), Ω(1), . . . , Ω(r) such that for any t < k and S ∈ Ω(t), R ∈ Ω(k) it holds that
w(S) < w(R). Denote qt = w(S) for any S ∈ Ω(t), t = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Proposition 4. Let Ω(0), Ω(1), . . . , Ω(r) be the weight-increasing ordering of the equal
weight partition of 2N . Set qt = w(S) for any S ∈ Ω(t), t = 1, 2, . . . , r. Then there is a
finite number r ≤ 2n−1 of marginal quotas and corresponding intervals of stable power
(qt−1, qt] such that W (N, qt,w) ⊂ W (N, qt−1,w).
From Proposition 4 it follows that there exist at most r distinct voting situations
generating r vectors of power indices.
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Proposition 5. Let [N, q,w] be a simple quota weighted committee and (qt−1, qt] is
the interval of stable power for quota q. Then card(Ci(N, q,w)) = card(Ci(N, γ,w))
and card(Pi(N, q,w)) = card(Pi(N, γ,w)) for any γ = 1− qt +ε, where ε ∈ (0, qt− qt−1]
and for all i ∈ N .
While in [N, q,w] the quota q means the total weight necessary to pass a proposal
(and therefore we can call it a winning quota), the blocking quota means the total weight
necessary to block a proposal. If q is a winning quota and (qt − 1, qt] is a quota interval
of stable power for q, then any voting quota 1− qt−1 + ε (where 0 < ε ≤ qt − qt−1), is a
blocking quota. From Proposition 5 it follows that the blocking power of the committee
members, measured by swing and pivot-based power indices, is equal to their voting
power. Let r be the number of marginal quotas, then from Proposition 4 it follows that
for power indices based on swings and pivots the number of majority power indices does
not exceed d r2e (smallest integer greater or equal to
r
2 ).
Proposition 6. Let [N, q,w] be a simple quota weighted committee, d be a distance
function and πi(N, q,w) be relative power indices for marginal quotas qt, and qt∗ be the
majority marginal quota minimizing the distance d[π(N, qj ,w),w] where j = 1, 2, . . . , r,
r is the number of intervals of stable power such that qj are marginal majority quotas,
then the fair quota for a particular power index used with respect to distance d is any
γ ∈ (qt∗−1, qt∗ ] from the quota interval of stable power for qt∗ .
From Proposition 6 it follows that the voting rule based on quota qt∗ minimizes
selected distance between the vector of relative voting weights and the corresponding
vector of relative voting power. The problem of fair quota has an exact solution via the
finite number of majority marginal quotas.
4. FAIR QUOTA IN THE LOWER HOUSE OF THE CZECH PARLIAMENT
The Lower House of the parliament has 200 seats. Members of the Lower House are
elected in 14 electoral districts from party lists by proportional system with 5 % thresh-
old. Seats are allocated to the political parties that obtained not less than 5 % of
total valid votes roughly proportionally to fractions of obtained votes (votes for par-
ties not achieving the required threshold are redistributed among the successful parties
roughly proportionally to the shares of obtained votes). Five political parties qualified
to the Lower House: left centre Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně
demokratická, ČSSD), right centre Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická
strana, ODS), right TOP09 (Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita – Traditions, Responsi-
bility, Prosperity 2009), left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická
strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM) and supposedly centre (but not very clearly located on
left-right political dimension) Public Issues (Věci veřejné, VV).
In Table 1 we provide results of the 2010 Czech parliamentary election (by relative
voting weights we mean fractions of seats of each political party, by relative electoral
support fractions of votes for political parties that qualified to the Lower House, counted
from votes that were considered in allocation of seats). Three parties, ODS, TOP09 and
VV, formed right-centre government coalition with 118 seats in the Lower House.
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Seats Votes in % if valid Relative voting Relative electoral
votes weight support
ČSSD 56 22.08 0.28 0.273098
ODS 53 20.22 0.265 0.250093
TOP09 41 16.7 0.205 0.206555
KSČM 26 11.27 0.13 0.139394
VV 24 10.58 0.12 0.13086∑
200 80.85 1 1
Tab. 1. Results of 2010 election to the Lower House of the Czech
Parliament.1
We assume that all Lower House members of the same party are voting together
and all of them are participating in each voting act. Two voting rules are used: simple
majority (more than 100 votes) and qualified majority (at least 120 votes). There exist 16
possible winning coalitions for simple majority voting (12 of them are winning coalitions
for qualified majority), 16 marginal majority quotas and 16 majority quota intervals of
stable power (see Table 2). For analysis of fair voting rule we selected Shapley–Shubik
power index and Euclidean distance function. In Table 3 we provide Shapley–Shubik
power indices (distribution of relative voting power) for all of marginal majority quotas.
Parties of possible winning Absolute marginal Relative marginal Interval of stable
coalitions majority quota majority quota power
ODS+KSČM+VV 103 0.515 (0.485, 0.515]
ČSSD+KSČM+VV 106 0.53 (0.515, 0.53]
ČSSD+ODS 109 0.545 (0.53, 0.545]
ODS+TOP09+VV 118 0.59 (0.545, 0.59]
ODS+TOP09+KSČM 120 0.6 (0.59, 0.6]
ČSSD+TOP09+VV 121 0.605 (0.6, 0.605]
ČSSD+TOP09+KSČM 123 0.615 (0.605, 0.615]
ČSSD+ODS+VV 133 0.665 (0.615, 0.665]
ČSSD+ODS+KSČM 135 0.675 (0.665, 0.675]
ODS+TOP09+KSČM+VV 144 0.72 (0.675, 0.72]
ČSSD+TOP09+KSČM+VV 147 0.735 (0.72, 0.735]
ČSSD+ODS+TOP09 150 0.75 (0.735, 0.75]
ČSSD+ODS+KSČM+VV 159 0.795 (0.75, 0.795]
ČSSD+ODS+TOP09+VV 174 0.87 (0.795, 0.87]
ČSSD+ODS+TOP09+KSČM 176 0.88 (0.87, 0.88]
ČSSD+ODS+TOP09+KSČM+VV 200 1 (0.88, 1]
Tab. 2. Possible winning coalitions in the Lower House of the Czech
Parliament (own calculations).
For any quota from each of intervals of stable power is Shapley–Shubik relative power
identical with relative power in corresponding marginal majority quota. Entries in the
row “distance” give Euclidean distance between vector of relative voting weights and
1Source: http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2010/ps?xjazyk=CZ
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Party Seats Relative SS power for
voting q = 0.515 q = 0.53 q = 0.545 q = 0.59 q = 0.6 q = 0.605 q = 0.615 q = 0.665
weight
ČSSD 56 0.28 0.3 0.35 0.3167 0.2667 0.3167 0.3667 0.3333 0.3
ODS 53 0.265 0.3 0.2667 0.3167 0.2667 0.2333 0.2 0.25 0.3
TOP09 41 0.205 0.1333 0.1833 0.2333 0.2667 0.2333 0.2 0.1667 0.1333
KSČM 26 0.13 0.1333 0.1 0.0667 0.1 0.15 0.1167 0.1667 0.1333
VV 24 0.12 0.1333 0.1 0.0667 0.1 0.0667 0.1167 0.0833 0.1333P
200 1 0.9999 1 1.0001 1.0001 1 1.0001 1 0.9999
distance 0.08339 0.08169 0.10802 0.07271 0.07996 0.10968 0.08501 0.08339
Party Seats Relative SS power for
voting q = 0.675 q = 0.72 q = 0.735 q = 0.75 q = 0.795 q = 0.0.87 q = 0.88 q = 1
weight
ČSSD 56 0.28 0.2667 0.2333 0.4333 0.3833 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2
ODS 53 0.265 0.2667 0.2333 0.1833 0.3833 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2
TOP09 41 0.205 0.1833 0.2333 0.1833 0.1333 0.1 0.3 0.25 0.2
KSČM 26 0.13 0.1833 0.15 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.2
VV 24 0.12 0.1 0.15 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.05 0 0.2P
200 1 1 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 1 1 1 1
distance 0.06238 0.07271 0.17874 0.20275 0.15637 0.14816 0.17875 0.14816
Tab. 3. Shapley–Shubik power of political parties for majority
marginal quotas (own calculations).
relative power for each quota interval of stable power.
The fair relative majority quota in our case is q = 0.675 (with respect to Euclidean
distance between relative voting weights and relative voting power equal to 0.06238),
or any quota from interval of stable power (0.665, 0.675]. It means that minimal num-
ber of votes to approve a proposal is 135 (in contrast to 101 votes required by simple
majority and 120 votes required by qualified majority). Voting rule defined by this
quota minimizes Euclidean distance between relative voting weights and relative vot-
ing power (measured by Shapley–Shubik power index) and approximately equalizes the
voting power (influence) of the members of the Lower House independently on their
political affiliation.
The distance measure of fairness follows the same logic as measures of deviation from
proportionality used in political science, evaluating the difference between results of
an election and the composition of an elected body – e. g. Gallagher [3] based on the
Euclidean distance, or Loosemore and Hanby [4] based on the absolute values distance.
Using in our particular case the absolute values distance we shall get the same fair quota.
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[9] W. S lomczyński and K. Życzkowski: From a toy model to double square root system.
Homo Oeconomicus 24 (2007), 381–400.
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